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I.

INTRODUCTION

Around the year 1200, in the ecclesiastical court, Martin, a rector,
sued "the parishioners of Nuthamstead."1 In 1315, in the exchequer
court, two individuals sued "'the rich burgesses'" of Scarborough "'for
themselves and the rest of the middling and poor burgesses'" of that
t Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles School of Law.
* Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. Co-author, 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTIE (2d ed. 1987) (Chapter 23, Class Actions). I am indebted to my colleagues Alexander McCall-

Smith, Joseph McKnight, Matthew Finkin, and Peter Winship for their comments on parts of
earlier drafts of this Review.
1. See infra note 25.
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town.' Are there any connections between these examples of medieval
group litigation and modern American class actions?
In answering "yes" to this question, Stephen Yeazell has given the
legal community a book of substantial significance. By exploring English history from the beginning, he has rediscovered missing links in the
ancestral chain of litigation prototypes. Yeazell's discovery is impressive, given that other legal historians have scoured the same ground
before but have not seen what Yeazell sees. The analogy comes to mind
of early archaeologists screening and sifting the artifacts from village
sites. Under new probing by a cultural anthropologist, the artifacts reveal a new dimension of man. Similarly, Yeazell reinterprets the known
historical cases involving medieval and later group litigation by using
modern scholarship to recreate the economic, political, and social context in which the group litigations arose. More importantly, Yeazell
asserts original theories of evolutionary linkage for explaining the
anomalies of modern class actions and for attempting to justify them in
terms of social organization, community conflict, and peaceful judicial
resolution of power struggles in different and evolving cultures.
Yeazell asserts theses in many fields, including constitutional law,
procedure, legal history, jurisprudence, and political theory. Some of his
theses are valid, some stretched, and some far fetched. Yeazell's implied
thesis, however, reduced to simplest terms, is that group representational litigation has been a continuous thread in the Anglo-American
legal system for 800 years. In contrast, the prevailing view of adjudication emphasizes individual, adversarial rights, and considers the modern class action as an exception to the norm. Under the conventional
view, therefore, the class action requires special jurisprudential
justification.
Yeazell, however, does not view the modern class action as a departure from the norm. Rather, he suggests that group representational litigation has been with us from the beginning and, therefore, has a claim
of legitimacy equal to that of ordinary litigation involving individual
persons or incorporated bodies. This de facto view of history is a major
contribution; but more importantly, Yeazell extracts from his exploration into the history of group litigation a normative theory of representation of interests in order to provide the jurisprudential justification.
Although he does not make the claim, Yeazell's book can be viewed
as providing the missing foundation for Abram Chayes' seminal article
2. Gegge v. Cross (Ex. 1315), reprintedin T. MADOX, "FIRMA BURGI," OR AN HISTORICAL EsSAY CONCERNING THE CITIES, TOWNS, AND BOROUGHS OF ENGLAND, TAKEN FROM RECORDS 96 n. b
(London 1726), cited in S. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS
ACTION 38 (1987).
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on the role of the judge in public law litigation.3 Chayes' article was
incomplete because Chayes only described what modern federal courts
have been doing in fact, in effect asserting that what is, ought to be."
Chayes showed that modern federal courts in fact were engaging in
community dispute resolution by traditionally nonjudicial, administrative, and mediative methods in the form of class actions. It did not necessarily follow, however, that these activities were a legitimate function
of the courts. Yeazell undertakes the Herculean task of attempting to
legitimate the modern class action by systematically invoking historical
analogy through different periods of time, and by justifying this history
under one overarching normative principle of procedure.

II. YEAZELL'S THESES
Beginning in the present, Yeazell articulates the main features of
the modern class action. The central issues in the modern class action
are to recognize the class and to decide the question of representation.
The modern class action creates an ad hoc litigating entity that binds
the class through its representatives. The court's first decision, to recognize a class, grants the group a form of power. Immediately thereafter
the court decides whether the persons seeking to represent the class are
5
worthy representatives.
The modern class action appears to be a major exception to the
individualistic Anglo-American law ethic. On the other hand, the class
action is not really so exceptional given the legal recognition conferred
on groups such as labor unions, business corporations, and beneficiaries
of administrative agency remedies. Each of these groups, however, finds
justification in various legal theories. Similarly, there is a need for a
justification for the modern class action. The judicial grant of the right
to sue on behalf of group members is the grant of a property right to
the group and to its representative.' An ad hoc group seeking to bring a
class action, therefore, must justify its status to the court.
Yeazell's book has three main components: narrative description,
doctrinal analysis, and consideration of political and legal history. The
descriptive narrative reports that the modern class action is part of a
long history of "group litigation-that is, lawsuits by and against num3. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1976).
This article is the lead to an extensive Developments In the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARv. L. REv.
1318 (1976), supporting Chayes' descriptive observations.
4. Chayes, Foreword: PublicLaw Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982)
(Chayes here favorably endorses the practices he earlier described in his 1976 article).
5.

S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 2.

6. Id. at 3.
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bers of individuals seen as a litigative entity."'7 This project involves
describing the medieval groups, their social characteristics, their economic roles, and then tracing them through English history. The evolution of early group litigation into private and municipal corporation law
cannot be understood without portrayal of the external, substantive societal struggles between villagers and their social superiors. The final
aspect of this description is to trace group litigation as it crossed the
Atlantic, adapted to the new republic, and accommodated the modern
circumstances of a mass society, such as movements for racial and other
social equalities.
The second, doctrinal aspect of the book attempts to show how the
legal rules governing group litigation have required continuing compromise with rules of procedure that are premised on assumptions of individualism. This tension presents us with the class action anomaly.' The
modern class action is an anomaly because when viewed as a mere rule
of procedure in court, the class action bypasses the normal outside legal
and political world that governs representation of individual choice. As
an exception to a societal struggle, the class action has the power to
transform modern life. The class action is an atavism and thus generates heated controversies of historical significance.1"
The third component of the book focuses on the concept of representation. On the surface, representation is merely a prerequisite to
group litigation. But there are other, less obvious aspects to the concept
of representation, such as judicial attitudes toward groups, and the political theory and constitutional thought about representation. An important point about medieval group litigation is that the authority to
litigate on behalf of existing organizations existed before, after, and independent of the litigation itself. In contrast, however, the issue of representation in modern class actions is ad hoc, inherent, and intertwined
with the question of judicially granting class status to the group. The
resulting modern class action provides a microcosmic laboratory in
which to examine legal institutions with respect to the opposing claims
of individualism and collective organization and their respective
justifications.1
Yeazell sees two incompatible ideas of representation: individual
autonomy versus representation without consent. To describe representative litigation, Yeazell posits the modern consumer class action
against a department store. The judicial recognition of the class over7. Id.
8. Id. at 4.
9. Id. at 5-6.
10. Id. at 8.
11. Id. at 6-7.
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comes the cost of organizing the consumers and shifts the advantage
from the defendant department store to the consumers, so much so that
the defendant may choose to settle rather than to take even a small
chance of losing at trial. The procedural contest over the propriety of
the proceeding matches the principle of individual autonomy against
12
the principle of class representation.
The puzzle concerning the modern class action is to find the missing link between it and other forms of representative litigation. Yeazell
suggests that a concept of interest that detaches representation from,
and in fact stands as a substitute for, individual initiative and consent
can be used to construct this missing link.13 He asserts that the class
action, by representing a group member's interest in the most effective
manner, justifies a procedure under which individuals can become legally bound without their consent. 4
Corporation law serves as one justification for group representation. One theory of the corporation is that the group takes on a permanent fictional legal life by a grant of power from the state. Another
competing theory is that the corporation arises from consensual agreement. The two theories of power and consent arrive at the same place,
legitimating litigation by a group. On the one hand, corporate litigation
can serve as a model to justify the modern class action. Conversely,
however, corporate litigation has served more often as an argumentative
12. Id. at 11. Yeazell observes that the principle of individual autonomy dominates most all
procedural rules, such as those governing standing, injury, and prohibition against solicitation.
These rules are all extensions of concepts of private property. The property rights are justified by
various theories of natural law and economic analysis. They project the assumption that the holders of the rights are best equipped to decide whether to bring suit to protect them. This notion of
individual autonomy is enshrined in the due process clause and in the principles of notice and res
judicata. But there are limits to individual autonomy. For example, legislative power to affect
property rights is demonstrated in legislative tax assessment cases. Further, representational
agreements are often privately formed through consensual arrangements as, for example, in insurance policies. In contrast, however, the class action procedural device gives rise to nonconsensual
representation. True, there are other forms of nonconsensual representation, such as representation of children and incompetent adults, but class actions are substantially unique in providing
nonconsensual representation to fully competent adults. Id. at 12-15.
13. Id. at 15. As Yeazell sees it:
One way of constructing the missing link is by a concept of interest that detaches representation from consent without requiring us to characterize the class as incompetent or ill served.
That concept lies at the heart of the modern class action and constitutes its response to the
objections of property and due process.
Id.; see also infra note 14.
14. Id. Yeazell states that:
Interest provides the substitute for individual initiative and consent; the class action justifies
action that legally binds another without his consent by pointing out that his interest is represented in a situation in which it is inconceivable that he would not wish his interest to be so
pursued. Specifying the conditions under which the modern class representative may thus
invoke interest to trump individualism is a large task .

. ..
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alternative to class litigation; namely, that the group should remain judicially unrecognized unless it obtains incorporation.1 5
In all organizational litigation, for example, litigation involving corporations, governmental agencies, and unions, the organization redistributes the impact on the individual-like the shareholder in corporate
litigation. Similarly, when a "litigative entity" is recognized in a class
action, the litigative entity itself is given power to redistribute the impact to the individual. A corollary is that the representative himself
then is simultaneously both empowered and burdened. 6
Although representative litigation through the class action commonly is thought of as an exception, there are indications that some
version of it has existed for 800 years. Only by examining the social
context exterior to the litigation, however, can the link to the past be
explained.' 7 To launch his search for explanations based on the social
context, Yeazell presents "Four Historiographies." He first analyzes the
writings of Zechariah Chafee. Chafee asserted that the class action, as
evolved from Court of Chancery bills of peace with multiple parties,
began with cases in the seventeenth century. 8 The notions advanced by
Chafee represent an American lawyer's conventional view of the matter.
Chafee, however, should have delved deeper into history by turning
to Frederic Maitland, the subject of Yeazell's second historiography. 9
Maitland, writing in 1898, describes the development of the class action
five centuries earlier than Chafee's proposed seventeenth century origins. Yeazell concludes that English medieval law routinely recognized
litigation by groups as long as the group had a real social and economic
15. Id. at 16-17. Yeazell's search in the history of the corporation proved largely fruitless
because the writings originally fell into three groups that ignore the question. On the one hand, Sir
Edward Coke, for example, severely distorted the evidence of early group litigation by retroactively
viewing it as a function of later cases involving corporation concepts. A second group of writers on
corporation law history simply assumes the concept of a corporation. A third quite recent approach
develops the corporation as a nexus of voluntary contracts among its constituents. None of these
three approaches illuminates the relationship to medieval group litigation. The power of this conventional history of corporations thus deceives and distracts. Id. at 31-33.
16. Id. at 20-21.
17. Yeazell explains that:
Social context matters. Briefly put, that is half of the argument of this book-that procedural
rules take on different colors in the light of differing social settings.. . . Where villages, parishes, guilds, and other units provided the center of economic and social life, the appearance
of these groups in court, litigating through representatives, was no more noteworthy than the
court appearance of a corporation would be today. . . . [L]awyers spend virtually no time
worrying about the circumstances of litigative representation ....
There is no explicit medieval theory....
Id. at 21.
18. Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQurrY 163-66, 200-02 (1950), cited in S. YEAZELL, supra
note 2, at 24.
19. F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I
(reprint 1968) (2d ed. Cambridge 1898), cited in S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 26.
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existence; but he argues that Maitland failed to describe the concept of
representation because of Maitland's focus on the legal concept of incorporation. This aspect of Maitland's focus was influenced by Henry
Maine, the subject of Yeazell's third historiography. 0 Maine based his
views on social anthropology, trying to show that early human culture
had been communal rather than individualistic.
The fourth historiography chronicles Helen Cam and her theories
of the life of the community.21 She argued that from a very early date
the legal system treated vills as de facto communities both in and out of
court. Cam stopped at the vill, but could have gone on to examine other
medieval groups as well. Yeazell proposes to expand both Maitland's
and Cam's work from the perspective of representation of groups. Thus,
he proposes to fill in the medieval prehistory and the prologue to seventeenth century Chancery cases.22
Finally, Yeazell discovers his own original source for the class action by searching for concepts of representation in political theory. The
questions concerning group litigation are analogous to those of political
representation in western democracies. In the case of English medieval
litigation, therefore, one must analyze the political theory upon which
Parliament is based. William Stubbs' controversial ConstitutionalHistory of England in 1876 viewed Parliament as a legislative assembly
emerging in 1295.23 Others attacked Stubbs, viewing early Parliament
not as a legislature, but as a court. A third group of scholars has examined Parliament by looking at the practices and theories of representation emerging in the fourteenth century. The modern tradition now
focuses on the forms of representation appropriate to Parliament. The
question of the nature of parliamentary representation, then, constantly
confronts Yeazell in his undertaking to establish a connection between
the modern class action and medieval group representative litigation.24
III.

THE MEDIEVAL CASES AND SOCIAL CONTEXT

Having outlined the general theses of what he proposes to do,
Yeazell begins in 1199 with the case of Martin, the Rector of Barkway,
suing the parishioners of a village.25 Martin sued the parishioners
20.

H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 258-73 (London 1861), cited in S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 27.
STUDIES PRESENTED TO ROSE GRAHAM 1-

21. Cam, The Community of the Vill, in MEDIEVAL
14 (V. Ruffer & A. Taylor ed. 1950), reprinted in LAW

FINDERS AND LAW-MAKERS IN MEDIEVAL

ENGLAND 83 (1962), cited in S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 30.
22. S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 21.

23. W.

STUBBS,

THE

CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND, ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT

(1880), cited in S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 34.
24. S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 36-37.
25. Martin, Rector of Barkway v. Parishioners of Nuthamstead (1199), in Select Cases From
the Ecclesiastical Courts of the Province of Canterbury, c. 1200-1301, 95 SELDON Soc. 8 (N. Ad-
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"neither as a corporation nor as individuals." The suit instead grouped
the defendants as "the parishioners." During the next century, in 1256,
three villagers sued on behalf of their community a second community.
Yeazell indicates that, though the records are fragmentary, these suits
suggest that the courts' concern was not whether the citizens could sue
or be sued as a group, but rather the disposition of the action through
an examination of the merits of the case. 6
These two suits make sense only on the premise revealed in a
phrase in the pleadings-that the representatives spoke "on behalf of"
all members of the group. These cases are baffling unless one considers
the social context. Three points should be made. First, the contrast between medieval and modern group litigation must be recognized. The
social contexts are so different it would be a mistake to speak of an
unbroken and unified eight century tradition. Second, medieval groups
pre-existed the litigation to which they were a party. Third, some medieval groups were groups of command; some were groups of consent; and
some were mixed. An important aspect of these features is the shifting
attitude of the Crown, more often than not mandating, but sometimes
challenging the group.
The most extreme and puzzling of medieval group litigations involved "the poor" of a community.28 To understand how such a characterization and concept could be used and recognized, the history of
medieval England must be read in terms of collective organizations. Relationships between the villagers and the lords were highly regulated,
with detailed rules governing each group. The manor, for example, operated as a collective economic unit, winning a subsistence from the
land. One group was created by the institution of franc pledge, which
was rooted in the collective life of the village and required that unfree
males over the age of fourteen organize into groups. The members of
the group stood responsible for each other's good behavior. A similar
urge toward collective responsibility and self-government brought the
growth of the borough. The dealings between the lord and the borough
were collective, resulting in a degree of autonomy for the group. A similar process also took place in the form of church parishes. Another type
of group recognized was the guild. The most powerful and successful of
the earliest groups, however, were the religious communities. The law
gave entire deference to the communal existence of the group, recognizing it by deferring to the principle of hierarchy; only the abbot or abares & C. Donahue ed. 1985), cited in S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 38.
26. S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 38-39.
27. Id. at 39-40.
28. Id. at 40.
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bess could sue on its behalf or on behalf of an individual monk or nun. 9
All these groups operated on the basis of status. For example, because of their status the villeins were obliged to serve their lord, and
this service gave rise to or correlated with communal liability. The creation of collective responsibility for each type of group was a way to
maintain power throughout the system. The same was true with parishes. Thus, the issues at stake in medieval litigation with vills and parishes involved incidence of status rather than claims of individual right.
Group litigation seemed inevitable rather than remarkable. Whereas
the function of modern class actions is to overcome organizational
transaction costs that are otherwise insuperable, medieval litigations
did not change the basic power relationship between the group and its
adversary because the groups existed before and after the litigation.30
Unlike modern class actions, there was already in place a group organization, easy communication in the membership, and recognizable representative authority.
A slightly different type of group than that mandated from above
arose from undertaking voluntary obligation and obtaining collective
privilege by forming guilds or boroughs. The guilds often sued each
other over the privileges granted to them by charters from the King.
The two-way relationship between guild or borough and the King arose
from the process of winning privilege from the King, who subcontracted
governance to the group. The guild or borough received a monopoly and
the King in turn got a "farm"3 " from the borough or guild, in other
words, a liability for a collective tax. As a result of this relationship, the
King brought many suits in Exchequer against both boroughs and
guilds. Again, the voluntary associations pre-existed litigation. Thus,
the group litigation did not reallocate power between them and the
King, other than to decide the question of the merits. Individuals were
liable for the collective liability for the group. The group reassigned liability internally. Some suits even ended in money damages. The merits
mattered a great deal to everyone, including the King, overshadowing
any questions going to the fact of group representation.32
The writ of quo warranto shows another variation on group litigation. Ostensibly a challenge to the group authority, the context reveals
that these writs were used to obtain revenue for the King. As noted
previously, the "farm" was a voluntarily assumed obligation in exchange for privilege; whereas the franc pledge was an involuntary obli29. Id. at 41-46.
30. Id. at 46-57.
31. Id. at 63.
32. Id. at 58-68.
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gation. In none of the early cases involving either involuntary or
voluntary groups did the King wish to challenge the right to litigate
collectively because it was in his self-interest to impose the liability on
33
a collective body through litigating representatives.
What was the relationship of this early litigation to emerging concepts of the corporation and property? Maitland was technically correct
in distinguishing that this early evolution did not involve corporate title
to property, but only title to property in individuals. Maitland, however, missed the overarching point that this early dispute resolution
provided the medieval equivalent of corporation law, in that there existed community property in the rights and privileges of the group. 4
These various collective bodies were significant to the development
of representative group litigation throughout the first five hundred
years, but these years also pose a number of mysteries. The village had
survived, but in a new form. The parish endured. Although there was
de facto group litigation during this period, as opposed to modern class
litigation, the emergence of the formal recognitional representative class
suit did not occur until the 1700s. Why so little theory was developed
concerning group litigation during the first five hundred years remains
a mystery. The King himself sometimes equivocated about groups; during one quo warranto proceeding the King, on the surface at least, appeared to turn against the group. Yet no theory of the representative
35
developed during this period.
Yeazell poses his political theory of medieval group litigation to answer the mystery. Many contemporary scholars now see the state as the
33. Id. at 67-68. Yeazell further explores the grant theory and quo warranto proceedings. The
practical and realistic end result of quo warranto proceedings in 1278 and 1294 under Edward I
was for the defendants to purchase franchises from the King. Later, in 1388, Richard II employed
the same device against the guilds. Yeazell criticizes Coke, who wrote in the seventeenth century,
for interpreting these early cases as evidence of the King's hostility to unpermitted corporate activity. The reason for Coke's legal distortion was that Coke was an advocate of the grant theory of
incorporation, and thus he failed, or refused, to see the reality that the King's revenue was at
stake. But there are two distinctions that Coke should have drawn. One is the right to act as a
group. This is separate and distinguishable from the right of the group to exercise particular powers, which was the key issue in these early proceedings. The King was worried about royal income
and power, not about the internal structure of the organizations or their right to exist as a group.
The first corporate charter was made to Coventry in 1345, even though it lacked some of the
five legal criteria later used to define corporations. Corporate concepts had not reached a high level
of sophistication at this stage. Perpetualness was an incidental, unimportant feature. Medievalists
did not fail to see the distinctions; the distinctions did not yet exist. Nor did the King yet see that
challenging the internal constitution and the litigating status of the group were separate questions
of power related to the King's exclusive grant of particular powers to the group. During his inquiry
into guilds in 1388, however, Richard II did examine their internal organization; yet he did not
seek to change them. See id. discussion at 75-85.
34. Id. at 68-69, 74-75.
35. Id. at 69-71. The absence of a theory, however, may be less mysterious and more typical
of the norm in an age not given to abstraction.
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grantor of corporate powers for which the group has petitioned. On the
contrary, medieval litigation suggests that the authorities called the
group into being for their own purposes. These scholars are now perplexed in answering questions as to the relationship of the member to
the organization, for the system was based not in law, but in custom
and group autonomy. Yeazell makes three claims regarding the mystery
of medieval group litigation. First, no answers were necessary during
the first five hundred years because the social context raised no questions. Second, the representative was expected to take the best view
rather than the membership's polled view, but representatives in fact
did take individual opinion of the group into account. Third, those involved in the beginning of a new legal culture in the seventeenth century began to see the unincorporated group as an extraordinary, rather
than as an ordinary, party to litigation. 6
Yeazell cautions that it is baffling to superimpose our modern ideas
on the medieval reality. Two distorted and inaccurate views of the medieval group can arise without considering the historical context. First,
it is a tempting deception to believe that medieval law had invented
something like the modern class action. Group litigation was simply a
fact, not a theory. The other deceptive conclusion is that the village,
parish, guild, and borough reflect the modern analogy to the corporation. Yeazell agrees with Maitland's view that it is tempting but erroneous to view medieval groups as corporations.8 7
IV. THE TRANSITION OF MEDIEVAL GROUPS TO THE SIXTEENTH
CENTURY

In 1613, in The Case of Suttons Hospital," Sir Edward Coke developed the modern theory of corporations as grants of power from the
state. Coke's theory badly misdescribed the five hundred years previous
in order to fit the past into his theory. 9 The importance of Coke's
scheme lay in the future. He had seized for the state a monopoly on the
power to recognize groups. This system made anomalous and suspect
any group that had not obtained a charter. Coke subsumed all the previous medieval litigation groups into the fiction that they were corporations either by prescription of implied grant or by lost charters. This
simply was not in fact the case, either in the past or in the present.
For example, parish litigation groups most clearly did not fit Coke's
36. Id. at 93-99. To illustrate the contrast, Yeazell quotes a remarkable thirteenth century
writ recognizing three or four men of the village as representatives of the whole as "'the law and
custom of the realm.'" Id. at 98.
37. Id. at 100-17.
38. 77 Eng. Rep. 937 (Ex. Ch. 1613), cited in S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 109.
39.

S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 111-13.
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mold. There occurred many vigorous disputes between the priests and
the rectors over tithes, and also over maintenance respecting the physical property of the church. Further, when the Tudors destroyed the
monasteries as the institutions that cared for the poor and transferred
the monastic functions and property to the local churches, the transfer
increased the importance and official standing of the parish. Thus,
there occurred many litigations by the overseers of the poor to enforce
obligations to them. While Coke was creating his theory of corporations,
the Tudor state was busy reshaping the parish and applying it to new
group tasks.4 °
The transformation of the old groups, guilds and villeins, went on
apace. Villeins became free copyholders."1 Unincorporated guilds became covered by entities that were incorporated. Merchant guilds gave
way to boroughs and craft guilds. Trade wars were litigated and incorporation "'became . . .the recognized method of evading the Statute
of Monopolies passed in 1624.' 142
Incorporation became a method of

survival. Capitalism began to emerge.
Religious guilds suffered a slow death. In 1547, the first year of Edward IV, a statute passed that dissolved chanceries, colleges, and free
chapels and seized all their possessions. The act that abolished these
entities, however, in a savings clause, said that it did not "in any wise
extend or be prejudicial or hurtful to the general corporation of any
city, borough or town."43 The statute provided that" 'the King our sovereign lord shall . . . have and . . . enjoy all fraternities, brotherhoods
and guilds . . . .,,, This language indicates that the conceptual land-

scape was changing so much that the litigative capacity of informal
groups now had to be rethought.45
By the fifteenth century the franc pledge was also dying out. The
village lasted, but villeinage did not. Economics gradually converted villeins into freeholders. Villeins originally could seek only the protection
of the manorial courts. As villeins attained copyhold status, however,
they could seek the protection of the royal courts. Gradually, Chancery,
in the fifteenth century, began to protect copyholders. The breakdown
of the manorial villeinage system decreased the need for group litigation to litigate the obligations of the village. Incorporation began to dis40.
41.
the will
tenant's
42.
TORY OF
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 117.
A copyholder was a tenant by copyhold tenure. Copyhold tenure was a form of estate at
of the lord that derived its name from the copies of the court rolls, which evidenced the
admittance to a parcel of land belonging to the manor.
S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 118 (footnote omitted) (quoting 3 E. LiPSON, ECONOMIC HISENGLAND 331 (6th ed. 1956)).
Id. at 120 (quoting An Act for Chantries Collegiate, 1547 1 Edw. 6, ch. 14, § 34).
Id. at 119-20 (quoting An Act for Chantries Collegiate, supra note 43, § 9).
Id. at 120.
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tinguish the fortunate successful group from the unsuccessful group.
The need for group representation, however, did not decline entirely.
First, a new shared struggle between groups of copyholders and the lord
reinforced the need for cohesion. Second, the village survived and generated a need for new organization. Two forms of incorporation were
now emerging: the true corporation; and the officially sanctioned quasicorporations, guilds and parishes, which were mandated, but not officially incorporated. 8
V.

THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY: STAR CHAMBER AND CHANCERY

By the year 1600 group litigation had changed and become isolated.
What was left of group litigation had migrated to two courts with specific jurisdiction, the Star Chamber and the Chancery. This migration
indicates that group litigation had become specialized. The collapse of
the Lancastrian rule and the near chaos that followed had a tremendous effect on the courts. In the face of corruption and anarchy in the
common law courts, people sought protection in the Star Chamber and
later in the Chancery.
The Court of Star Chamber originally was focused on maintaining
order in the land. Starting in the fifteenth century, the Chancellor had
begun to protect manorial title and copyholders' rights, which were unenforceable in the courts of common law. The Star Chamber in turn
began to deal with groups of manorial tenants who were asking for protection against extortion, oppression, forestalling, regrading, and enclosure, all of which were thought to bring on rural poverty and
starvation. 7 Early in the year 1500, tenants complained of numerous
"hurtes and wronges"'48 perpetrated by the lords. The tenants were able
to win the sympathetic ear of the Star Chamber, one of the most powerful bodies in the land. Other cases show not only rural groups, but, for
example, the mayor, the commoners, and aldermen of Newcastle with
claims against a monopoly. Parishes also appeared as parties before the
Star Chamber. Many other disputes between groups, which looked
more like administrative inquiries into the causes of unrest, came
before the Star Chamber. If the courts were ineffective, any serious dispute involving groups of people threatened to become general social unrest. As a result, two of the Star Chambers' special concerns were the
quelling of unrest and the restoration of the normal course of govern46.
47.
48.
Court of
128.

Id. at 120-25.
Id. at 125-28.
Select Cases before the King's Council in the Star Chamber, Commonly Called the
Star Chamber, 25 SELDON Soc. 6 (I. Leadam 1911), cited in S. YEA ELL, supra note 2, at
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ment. The significant point, however, was that jurisdiction over groups
had shifted from the courts of the common law to the Star Chamber.4 9
The Star Chamber gradually turned its attention from civil to
criminal law matters and then was abolished during the Puritan revolution in the seventeenth century for its hated inquisitorial procedure.
Thus, group litigation had no place to go but to the Court of Chancery.
Chancery had begun to recognize the rights of rural groups, but now
conceived of its jurisdiction as being extraordinary. Meanwhile, the
common-law courts developed the view that groups required incorporation. From these strands began to emerge the legal doctrines now
known as the rule of necessary parties and the "exception" for class
actions.5 0
Two errors have been made in this context. First, one should not
view these seventeenth century cases as the beginning of group litigations. Second, one should not assume that the prior 500 years had
moved forward unchanged. A number of related misunderstandings are
contained in these two basic errors. For example, the seventeenth century group litigation cases were not the first. Rather, their concentration in Chancery was a new development in the seventeenth century.
Furthermore, the common view, now retroactively imposed, that efficiency was the guiding force behind these group litigations, is inaccurate. The reality is that these cases involved the group rights of residual
medieval collectives.
The seventeenth century village, manor, and parish cases, thought
to be exemplary of joinder cases, were, in reality, exclusive examples of
residual collectives." By then the approach of the Chancery Courts had
completely changed; class litigation was the exception rather than the
rule. These village, manor, and parish cases demonstrate how early
modern group litigation took shape.
From these historical and social perspectives, Yeazell reinterprets
the famous cases of Howe v. Tenants of Bromsgrove,52 which concerned
the Lord's dispute with his tenants over the Lord's claim of an exclusive right to kill small game, and Brown v. Vermuden,53 a dispute between the vicar and a parish of lead miners over the tithe from a lead
mine. These and other, similar cases pose many puzzles for the modern
lawyer looking backward. Several things, however, are clear. First, in49. S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 128-29.
50. Id. at 130-31.
51. Yeazell writes: "[Elvery sixteenth- and seventeenth-century case of group litigation I
have found involves the members of rural agricultural communities." Id. at 137 (emphasis in
original).
52. 23 Eng. Rep. 277 (Ch. 1681); see S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 133-34.

53. 23 Eng. Rep. 796 (Ch. 1676); see S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 134.
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stances of group litigation regularly involved defendant, as well as
plaintiff classes. Second, all the cases involved substantive law that was
largely a product of local custom. Third, by this time none of the cases
involved actions for money damages. Finally, all the disputes arose out
of village, manor, or parish communities.
From a different historical perspective, looking forward from the
year 1400, there were also many puzzles for the medieval lawyer. Why
were there no suits for damages? What had become of group litigation
involving groups other than tenants and parishioners? Why was there
now a need for explicit justification for representation of the group, as
opposed to willing acceptance? 54 Yeazell concludes that group litigation
in the seventeenth century resulted from community status rather than
the assertion of legal rights. 5
Chancery began to inquire not only into the representation, but
also whether a suit by a representative was even appropriate. The
Chancery Court also began to limit the group remedies. The proceedings looked more like political accommodation than adjudication. These
litigations formed a shaky bridge between medieval and modern group
litigation. 6
Yeazell then examines village, manor, and parish litigation in the
seventeenth century in greater detail to demonstrate his main themes.
Yeazell recounts a large range of similar cases. Some litigation reflected
collusive action that acknowledged agreed-upon customs and was used
as a way to record the customs. In this way the seventeenth century
chancellor was replacing the manorial court. The proceedings show
vague recognitions of past decrees and flexible willingness to reconsider
them. A judicial preference existed for remedies based upon consent.
Unlike much modern litigation, these people had to live in continuing
relationships with one another, and all contemplated that the relationships would continue. Judicial orders frequently were not carried out;
the Chancellor often favored mediation and compromise.5 One decree
58
ordered that Magdalen College was "'compelled to an agreement.' ,
These orders gave considerable leeway to negotiation. The courts frequently reconsidered or changed decrees. In the extraordinary case of
Churchwardens of Northwould v. Scot5 9 a Chancery Court supervised a
54. S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 135.
55. Id. at 136 (stating that, "[s]eventeenth-century group litigation is not about the legal
rights of aggregated individuals but about the residual incidents of status flowing from membership in agriculture communities poised at the edge of a market economy").

56. Id.
57. Id. at 137-43.
58. Prebends & Scholars of Magdalen College v. Hide, 21 Eng. Rep. 138 (Ch. 1612), cited in
S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 143.
59. 21 Eng. Rep. 91 (Ch. 1581-82), cited in S. YEAzELL, supra note 2, at 144.
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bargain between the parson and the parishioners concerning the burdens to be shared by each in providing for the parish poor. These inconclusive decrees, what we now call "mediatory" decrees, softened the
impact of litigation. Yeazell explains that these decrees were part of the
process of equity, which replaced the local customary courts. The economic stakes, however, were large and the parties continued to maintain stubborn positions over time. 0
Yeazell traces the discovery of the formal concept of representation
to the case of Brown v. Vermuden.' In this case the plaintiff had sued
the whole body of tenants, and the defendants were permitted to
choose their representatives.62 The procedure of advance notice and
consent becomes explicable in terms of the small cohesive group. The
Chancellor became uneasy about who represented the group because of
the great social changes that had occurred. In addition, the intellectual
climate concerning representation had changed. Representation was no
longer a simple matter of necessity by fact and definition. The great
parliamentary debates lay a century in the future; nevertheless, parliamentary elections became contentious and the theory emerged that the
greater number of votes, rather than the votes of the best people,
should determine the outcome. More dramatically, a King had been beheaded because he had failed to understand Parliament's claims to represent those whose consent was required for certain courses of action.
The unsolved puzzle remains: Was Lord Nottingham inventing the requirement of explicit authorization or was he codifying what already
63
had long been a custom?
Unlike medieval courts entertaining suits by and against groups,
these early modern judicial decrees were restricted to the rendering of
declarations. Yeazell found no instance of seventeenth century group
64
litigation in which Chancery decreed the payment of money damages.
He concludes that modern scholars are in error in concluding that, because Chancery was preventing a multiplicity of suits at common law,
Chancery was aggregating common-law damage actions.6 5 In fact, no
60.
61.

S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 144-45.
See supra note 53.

62. LORD NOTrINGHAM'S "MANUAL OF CHANCERY PRACTICE" AND "PROLEGOMENA OF CHANCERY
AND EQuITY" 95 (Yale ed. 1965), cited in S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 146. In a journal entry,
generally unpublished prior to 1965, Lord Nottingham recorded:
A bill to settle the customs of a manor wherein a multitude of tenants are concerned may be
exhibited by any three in the name of the rest, so as they produce before the Register a
sufficient authority to enable them to sue in the name of the rest, and so as they be responsible for the costs.

Id.
63. See supra note 62; S. YmEZELL, supra note 2, at 147-48.
64. S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 148.
65. Id.
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such thing occurred. Rather, the Chancery decrees were in the nature of
declaratory judgments. In several cases declarations were followed by
proceedings involving those who violated the decrees.
In contrast to prior medieval group litigation, which involved the
full range of remedies without special justification, seventeenth century
remedies were limited and required special justification. As far as the
records show, the seventeenth century chancellors knew nothing of the
former medieval group litigation. What the chancellors did understand,
however, was that they now were substituting for the manorial court,
which generally operated by prospective decree. The opportunity to recover damages now had disappeared, but all members of the group were
still interested in the prospective declaration.6
The emergence of the requirement that the representative have explicit authorization and the concomitant limitation of remedies began
to send this type of litigation into decline. These cases typically raised
issues of custom as questions of fact, resulting in disuniformity from
case to case and place to place. As the formalizing limits for reasonableness were asserted, however, the process began to transform fact into
law. This process, which has become familiar to legal anthropologists, is
generally associated with the movement from customary law in a status-based society to a system of codes and decisional law in a society
held together by the market. This process contributed to the inflexibility of group litigation and, eventually, to its death as a de facto institution. In the past, parties at first were bound by prior decrees, not based
on theories of prior adjudication, but based on necessity. Custom, however, now had become law by virtue of the decree."
The emergence of the doctrine of necessary parties remains a mystery. It is paralleled closely in time with the emergence of the concept
of incorporation and the formulation of the "exception" to the necessary parties rule for class actions. According to one Chancery Court,
unless litigation by and against the class through representatives was
allowed, some suits "'would be impossible to be ended.' "68 The Chancellor was speaking of an exception in terms of functional utility. To be
sure, this notion, flying in the face of the necessary parties doctrine,
would be confined to cases where it was absolutely necessary. The
Chancellor was saying, however, that procedure must be accommodated
to fit social circumstances as seen in the light of some rather basic goals
of the judicial system. During this period political theory was shifting
with the Renaissance and began to focus on the individual rather than
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 149-51.
Id. at 151-54.
Id. at 155.
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VI. THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF GROUP
LITIGATION

Yeazell calls the next stage of evolution "the industrialization of
group litigation." This describes an evolution from litigation groups
that have de facto social cohesion into a different spectrum, one in
which groups simply have a shared interest without any social cohesion.
The last case typifying the old medieval model was Brown v. Howard,70
brought by the Tenants of Greystock Manor in 1700. The only real issue was whether the contributing tenants had to be formal parties to
the action to avoid the crime of maintenance. The answer was no: "'[[lt
is no Maintenance for all the Tenants to contribute, for it is the Case of
all. . . .' ,,71 One hundred twenty-eight years later, the case of Hichens
v. Congreve,72 in Chancery, represented the new model of shared interest without a social cohesion. Hichens involved a representative suit on
behalf of more than 200 shareholders against the promoters of their
company for fraud in not revealing the promoters' fee. The shareholders sought to hold the promoters liable jointly and severally to the company. The promoters' objection, that not all shareholders were joined,
was summarily overridden by the Chancellor.
Two aspects of group litigation had changed. First, no longer was
there an existing social group; Hichens broke the thread from the seventeenth century and medieval group litigation. Second, this and other
cases now assessed money remedies for failure to comply with rules of
law, and as such differed from the seventeenth century equity cases.
Ironically, Hichens, a nineteenth century case, now looks more analogous to some of the medieval cases with respect to applying rules of law
and granting damages, whereas in seventeenth century cases the courts
issued prospective decrees tied to custom. The social context had been
transformed. The rural, agricultural society, marked by custom, had
one.
evolved into an urban, individualistic, entrepreneurial, capitalistic
73
emerged.
had
groups
New
Society had been reconstructed.
Friendly societies were attempts by the artisan class to shoulder
responsibility for the downtrodden by providing a small measure of assurance against illness and death. These societies provided activities for
69. Id. at 155-59.
70. 21 Eng. Rep. 960 (Ch. 1701), cited in S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 162 (involving "'Tenants of Greystock Manor against the Lord, to settle the Customs of the Manor as to Fines Upon
Deaths and Alienations'" (emphasis in original)).
71. Brown, 21 Eng. Rep. at 960, cited in S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 163.
72. 38 Eng. Rep. 917 (Ch. 1828), cited in S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 164.
73.

S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 164-66.
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social purpose, funds for disability, and old age pensions. Not until the
passage of the first Friendly Society Acts in 17937' however, did the
organizations achieve full legality. Under government encouragement
they evolved into insurance companies. Meanwhile, severe tensions
arose between the contributors and beneficiaries. These disputes required court attention.
At the other end of the social ladder, joint stock companies
emerged. The joint stock companies at first existed in a legal vacuum
between individual entrepreneurship and chartered corporations. As a
result of wide scale stock frauds, the Bubble Act made "'the acting or
presuming to act as a corporate body. . . illegal and void"' and left a
criminal sword hanging over the joint stock companies.76 The Act was
repealed in 1825.76 Finally, legislation culminated in the Companies Act
of 1844. 77
The legislation governing friendly societies and joint stock companies began to make the members' relationships more legally explicit and
more narrow than the generally fluid life of older groups. In addition,
the members could now withdraw and the group could dissolve. Thus,
many disputes were internal to the group. 8
The courts now faced a problem of theory in modern group litigation. Two concepts-two justifications-emerged. One was consent, the
other interest. Consent was based on ideas of agency. Interest, on the
other hand, depended only on congruence. Since 1700 the theory of
group litigation has been torn between these two conceptions that legitimate representation of absentees. In seventeenth century cases both
consent and congruence of interest were present. In the eighteenth century, gradually only congruence of interest became sufficient.
Chancey v. May7" illustrates the discovery of a new rationale. In
that case the Chancellor overruled an objection claiming that not all the
investor-shareholders had joined. Many delicate political questions underlay this ruling because the Chancellor in effect was validating a
group even though it had not incorporated. The court casually announced that the other shareholders "were in effect parties." With this
announcement, a dramatic shift had taken place-allowance of group
action in the absence of actual consent. The court had substituted the
strong agency concept of consent representation for the weaker concept
74. 33 Geo. 3, ch. 54 (1793), cited in S. YzmL, supra note 2, at 167; see S. YEAZELL, supra
note 2, at 166-69.
75. 6 Geo. 1, ch. 18 (1719), cited in S. YEAZMLL, supra note 2, at 170.
76. 6 Geo. 4, ch. 91 (1825), cited in S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 173.
77. 7 & 8 Vict., ch. 110 (1844), cited in S. YzAzgLL, supra note 2, at 173.
78. S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 173-74.
79. 24 Eng. Rep. 265 (Ch. 1722), cited in S. YEAzELL, supra note 2, at 176.
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of interest representation. 0
Chancery groped around in this theoretical dilemma with uncomprehending confusion and false formulations. As the law encountered a
great number of new groups, tracing the doctrinal results became very
messy. For example, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke erroneously attempted
to formulate a class action by requiring a general customary right and
privity.8' On the other hand, other cases employed the new theory that
interest alone was sufficient.82
S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 176-79.
The lead case of City of London v. Perkins, 1 Eng. Rep. 1524 (H.L. 1734), cited in S.
YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 179, was decided in the House of Lords and involved the right of the
City of London to collect duties on the import of cheese. Perkins arose in Exchequer, not Chancery, and the issue was not framed in terms of the necessity of joining absent parties, but rather
whether the precedent of a prior decree imposing the duty should be binding on present freemen,
including the defendant. Perkins thus stands on the border between the formulation of two legal
principles, the doctrine of precedent and that of respect for judgments. Later, in Mayor of York v.
Pilkington, 26 Eng. Rep. 180 (Ch. 1737), cited in S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 180, Lord Chancellor
Hardwicke, nevertheless, viewed Perkins as exemplifying meaningless requirements for class actions set out in terms of general right and privity. See S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 181. Later
formulations followed this false lead. Lord Chancellor Hardwicke also erroneously implied that
group litigation was appropriate only when a customary right was claimed by or against several
persons. S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 182.
82. More in line with modem theory was Leigh v. Thomas, 23 Eng. Rep. 201 (Ch. 1751),
cited in S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 182-83, where the plaintiffs were two persons claiming to have
been appointed agents in a deed signed by sixty-four of the ship's eighty crew members. The objection was made that not all crew members were represented because not all had signed. The Court's
response was for the plaintiffs "'to bring a bill in behalf of the whole crew.' " Id. This again shifted
the theory from consent to interest. The rationale emerges that class representation can rest on an
entrepreneurial group, the crew, and some prior voluntary association without the specific consent
of all. Thus, circumstances of similarity of interest, combined with the difficulty of handling the
suit if all were to be joined, would suffice. S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 183.
In Adair v. New River Company, 32 Eng. Rep. 1153 (Ch. 1805), cited in S. YEAZELL, supra
note 2, at 184, Lord Eldon, while dismissing the case on the merits, revised the understanding of
the past and gave the new theory a boost for the future by stating a very liberal rule of convenience for excusing joinder. Lord Eldon first recognized the necessary parties rule but then allowed
class actions as an exception. Magically recasting the history of former cases, Lord Eldon transformed them into a justification for the new modern stockholders class suit by basing the justification for both on interest representation. He thus converted the social necessity demonstrated in
the past into the power of present judicial discretion. He also made the recognition of the group a
threshold question and allowed the judges to use their sense as to which groups deserved recognition. To do this, he chose the principle of representation of members' interests to justify an interest-based class. Lord Eldon's fragile emerging theory quickly ran into the political-legal problems
of friendly societies and corporations. Even he was perplexed. See S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at
186-87.
In Lloyd v. Loaring, 31 Eng. Rep. 1302 (Ch. 1802), cited in S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 188, a
suit involving internal factions of the Caldonian Lodge of Free Masons, Lord Eldon appeared to
backtrack and to perceive that the problem was more complicated. Lord Eldon, who was fearful of
the Masons, finally recognized the suit, but at the same time denied group standing to others. In a
number of other cases involving unincorporated associations that sought corporate status, the
dominant question was the substantive law involved. Thus, these suits showed two aspects of
group litigation: the groups versus the outside world and the internal relations of the group. In
such cases the court is essentially being asked to maximize the utility of all concerned. Lord Eldon
80.
81.
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The legislature finally acted to solve the problems facing the
courts. Parliament legitimated the friendly societies and helped them
limp into the next century when the welfare state took over. Group litigation on behalf of the downtrodden began to disappear. Much to the
relief of the judges, substance had displaced procedure. Legislation had
the same effect on joint stock companies. In these group litigation cases,
Chancery had found it necessary to declare the substantive law that
joined the members.
From this part of history, Yeazell concludes that group litigation
often may be a temporary phenomenon. It generally involves groups on
the edge of power and their temporary ability to get special assistance
from the court. Initial court recognition leads either to winning their
goals through political power with legislation or fading from view. Thus,
similarities exist concerning the questions of representation in court
and representation in the legislature.8 3

VII.

BuRKE, CALVERT, AND THE THEORY OF INTERESTS

By 1850 there had been many class cases in England, and restaters
of the law had made a number of attempts at comprehensive formulation. In contrast, in the United States only two cases involving group
litigation had been decided by federal courts. Justice Story, the only
legal commentator at that time, had written about them without any
real comprehension. Then a strange thing happened: an historical paradox began to emerge. 4 In England, where the class action showed great
potential, it was on the verge of extinction. But in the Pnited States,
where it had been restated in the most restrictive way, the class action
evolved and expanded; all without American lawyers having a clear theory of its historical and jurisprudential justifications.
Yeazell's thesis is that representative theory in English political
thought provides answers to the essential issues about class actions: recognition of the group and representation of the group. To understand
the interplay between group recognition and group representation requires a digression into the development of the theory of political
representation.8"
Group representational litigation is analogous to political representation. Both seek individual autonomy, but allow representation as a
solved one case by asking the society to make a settlement or else he would appoint a master.
When a uniform series of prior decisions supported dismissal for failure to join partners, Lord
Eldon finally permitted a representative suit that sought a dissolution of an association to proceed
without joinder. S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 188-94.
83. S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 194-96.
84. Id. at 197.
85. Id. at 198-99.
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matter of practical implementation. The justification of group litigation
representation, however, moved from consent to interest, while the legitimizing basis of political theory moved in the opposite direction,
from interest to consent. Thus, anomalies exist in both the litigation
and political arenas. The debates that accompanied the Parliamentary
Reform Bill of 1832 contain evidence that there were connections between the political and legal spheres. Edmund Burke borrowed the terminology of" 'virtual representation'" from the law of trusts." At the
same time, commentators on equity began to discuss various legal doctrines in terms of representation. The functional problems were similar.
The 1832 Reform Bill broadened the electoral franchise and redesigned
the geographic and demographic bases of Parliamentary representation.
Previously, representation in Parliament had been quite chaotic.
The adversaries in the debates over parliamentary representation
advanced two competing theories.8 7 Utilitarians relied on concepts of
agency and consent. More radical utilitarians argued for the complete
subjectivity of individual interest. Under this theory, the people judged
the utility after the fact of legislative representation through the power
of the popular vote.88
Against this view stood Edmund Burke, defender of the older order, and his theory of interests. "His argument is important, for it has
become the basis of much of modern class action doctrine."89 Burke's
theory was that the representative was to represent interests, not the
specific people and their subjective wishes. The representative was not
the agent of the electorate, but rather its trustee, positively charged to
seek the electorate's best interest by his own means. Thus, each city did
not require a specific representative as long as its interests, such as
those of the Irish and the Colonies,9 were adequately watched over by
trustees from similar constituencies. Burke distinguished between
short-term and long-term interests. He viewed long-term interests as
objective and detached from the subjective will of individual people.
This objective, abstract interest, therefore, did not depend upon the
consent of the ruled.9 '
According to Yeazell, Burke's theory was articulated by Frederick
Calvert as a basis for class representative theory in English law.2 Al86. Id. at 201.
87. Id. at 202.
88. Id. at 202-03.
89. Id. at 203.
90. Id. at 204.
91. Id. at 204-07.
92. F. CALVERT, A TREATISE UPON TiE LAW RESPECTING PARTIES TO SUITS
Philadelphia 1837) (London 1837), cited in S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 207.
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though the political debate between Burke and the utilitarians has
never been resolved, Frederick Calvert did address and resolve the central question that Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
modern rule regulating class actions, for the most part simply ignores.
Calvert's Parties to Suits in Equity in 1837 established the general rule
that all interested parties be joined."3 He indicated, however, that it was
a rule of convenience, which could be relaxed. In describing the appropriate conditions for a departure from the rule of individualism, Calvert
followed the lead of Lord Eldon and created a "Doctrine of Representation," under which the class representative was charged to protect the
interest at stake."' Calvert distinguished between cases in which
persons volunteered to act for others and cases in which they were
compelled to act for others in putting forth their own defense.
Plaintiffs' class actions, for example, required restraints. In an attempt
to impose limits, Calvert said that the plaintiff "shall have an interest
not merely in the property in question, but also in the object of the
suit."95

Yeazell draws the conclusion that Calvert's linking of individual,
subjective self-interest to objective, abstract interest created a shaky
bridge between the world of utilitarian capitalism and the Burkean
vision of representation. By identifying objective group interest with
subjective self-interest, Calvert liberated the concept of representation.
Calvert praised one court for posing group interest from the circumstances rather than inquiring into the actual motivation of the representation. 6 By linking the self-interest of the active litigant to the
interests of the passive ones, Calvert had articulated the theoretical
justification for group litigation. Calvert neatly concluded that, "when a
large number of persons have a common interest in the entire object of
a suit in its nature beneficial to all, one or more of them may sue on
behalf of all."'9 7 Calvert made the common assumption that each person
93.

S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 207.

94. F. CALvERT, supra note 92, at 19-20, cited in S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 208. The Doctrine of Representation states as follows:
[I]f the general rule requires a person to be present, merely as the owner and protector of a
certain interest, then the proceedings may take place with an equal prospect of justice, if that
interest receives an effective protection from others. It is the interest which the court is considering, and the owner, merely as the guardian of that interest: if then some other persons
are present, who with reference to that interest are equally certain to bring forward the entire
merits of the question, the object is satisfied for which the presence of the actual owner would
be required; and the court may, without putting any right in jeopardy, take its usual course,
and make a complete decree.
Id.
95. Id. at 32, cited in S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 208.
96.

S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 209.

97. F. CAIvSRT, supra note 92, at 36, cited in S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 209.
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would desire to gain a greater share of the world's goods. Translating
individual goods into the collective "Good," Calvert denied that only
the individual could know his Good."'
Joseph Story did not read Calvert until after Story had written his
own equity treatises. Although Story later claimed that he had not
overlooked any important authorities, he clearly did not understand
Calvert. 9 Further, Calvert was not cited by John Pomeroy and was dismissed by Zechariah Chafee. Professor Geoffrey Hazard, 100 it seems,
was the first to recognize Calvert's achievement: "[Calvert's] virtue is
that he saw more distinctly than many modern writers that the represented interests are based on social abstractions rather than instructions from or consent of the represented."' 1
In spite of the writings of Calvert, group litigation in England went
into hibernation. Group litigation-as it was then known-was overtaken by legislation. The regulation of joint stock companies and
friendly societies provided the substantive justification for letting the
class action fall out of use.
As a result of the 1875 reform that abolished Chancery as a separate court, the necessary parties rule in equity adjudication returned.
Under attack from Charles Dickens' Bleak House'02 and Parliament,
which was legislating on groups, equity courts were afraid to venture
any further. In addition, there seemed to be no stopping point to Calvert's theory, which was frightening if carried to its logical extreme.
Thus, group litigation, an historical puzzle, declined in England and instead expanded in the United States. 03
VIII. THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE AND THEORY RESTATED

Once Yeazell crosses the Atlantic to the United States, both his
description and criticism of class action treatment are more familiar to
the American lawyer.10 4 Joseph Story made the first error by reading
the old cases too narrowly and restating the class action rules as arising
from equity exceptions to the joinder of multiple necessary parties in
order to prevent a multiplicity of suits. 105 The Supreme Court endorsed
98. S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 209-10.
99. Id. at 210.
100. Hazard, Indispensable Party: The Historical Origin of a Procedural Phantom, 61
COLUM. L. REv. 1254, 1285-86 (1961), cited in S. YFAZELL, supra note 2, at 210.
101. S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 210.
102. C. DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (London 1853), cited in S. YFzAzL, supra note 2, at 211.
103. S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 211-12.
104. What follows in the text of this Review is a very short nutshell. Yeazell's treatment is
much more expansive and analytical.
105. S.YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 216-20 (reviewing J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE (Boston 1836) and J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS (Boston 1838)).
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Story's error with Equity Rule 48,106 but with good sense ignored Rule
0
48 and expanded the use of the class action in Smith v. Swormstedt."'
The American experience moved forward unevenly. Professor
Chafee saw that the class action question was one of trial court discretion and convenience, but only dimly perceived other implications.1 08 In
1938 the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Professor
James Moore, following the errors of Story, made an heroic but misguided attempt to restate the Rules in terms of substantive rights and
res judicata effect.10 9 In 1943, in an imaginative new thrust, Harry
Kalven, Jr., and Maurice Rosenfield proposed that the function of the
modern class action was to authorize private attorney general suits to
regulate a market economy. 11 0 Meanwhile, Congress and the courts recognized labor unions, the Supreme Court, in Hansberry v. Lee, imposed
due process restraints on interest representation,"" and the federal
courts advanced class actions to enjoin racial discrimination." 2
Reacting to these changes, in 1966, reformers redrafted the rule
governing class actions to rest upon the two warring concepts: representation of interest without consent; and representation based upon consent. The reformers thus failed to address the central question posed
and answered by Frederick Calvert a century before. The result is a
number of perplexing anomalies under which the rule does not require
consent but perhaps should, and under which the rule requires consent
but should not." 3
IX.

CRITIQUE

Yeazell is not shy in speculating about what lies beyond the surface
appearance of historical cases." 4 His reconstructions are highly sophisticated descriptions of the social context accompanying the cases. He
repeatedly cautions, however, against making simple assumptions about
transferring the medieval and later English experience to the modern
American class action. In spite of his disclaimer that there was no
theory upon which medieval group litigation was based, Yeazell risks
106. S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 221 (noting language of rule).
107. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853), cited in S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 221-22.
108. Z. CHAFEE, supra note 18, at 149-98, cited in S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 228-30.
109. S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 228-32.
110. Kalven & Rosenfield, The ContemporaryFunction of the Class Suit, 8 U. Cm. L. Rzv.
684 (1941), cited in S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 232-39.
111. 311 U.S. 32 (1940), cited in S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 241.
112. S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 232-37.
113. S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, ch. 9, at 238-66. In this chapter, Yeazell systematically reviews
modern class action law under Rule 23 against his thesis. See supra note 98.
114. At the same time, he is faithful to the ideal of intellectual integrity, S. YEAZELL, supra
note 2, at ix-x, and therefore issues frequent caveats against his own speculations.
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that his abstract theses will transcend the historical data.115 Indeed, the
very process of summarizing the book116 tends to focus on Yeazell's major theses and overlooks Yeazell's rich and complex treatment of history
and his cultural-legal anthropology. Apart from quibbling about
Yeazell's many minor themes,11 7 the following observations are made in
an attempt to isolate some major points of departure for criticism.
The most original and important of Yeazell's theories, and therefore the most tenuous, is that the political debates in the nineteenth
century, concerning the nature and concepts of parliamentary representation, in fact flowed by osmosis back and forth from Edmund Burke to
Frederick Calvert and his book, Parties to Suits in Equity. Through
the process of constant repetition and argumentation, speculation becomes, by the end of the book, an accepted fact. 18
The size of this leap, from hunch to asserted thesis, can be appreciated by hypothecating the great-great-grandson of Yeazell, or a writer
we might call "Yeazell The Fourth." If 150 years from now, in the year
2138, Yeazell The Fourth were to look back, he would find that Baker v.
Carr'1 9 was decided in 1962 and that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23, governing class actions, was adopted in 1966.120 Yeazell The Fourth,
therefore, could conclude that there was a substantial connection between the Baker v. Carr ruling requiring one-man, one-vote for purposes of political representation, and the concepts of representation
115. See, e.g., In re American Reserve Corp., 840 F.2d 487, 490 n.4 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding
that a representative creditor may file class proof of claim form in bankruptcy, and citing Yeazell
for the proposition that, "[tihere were earlier representational actions, but it is not necessary to
recount them").
116. Chapter ten of the book is a condensed version of the preceding nine chapters and can
serve as a substitute for those who want to obtain a synthesis of the book in the most efficient
form. By skipping the first nine chapters, however, a reader is deprived of Yeazell's rich scholarship and commentary.
117. One can argue that Yeazell expansively reads each of the historic cases in order to justify his theory of Rule 23, when other explanations are also plausible. See, e.g., Weiner & Szyndrowski, The Class Action, From the English Bill of Peace to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure23:
Is There a Common Thread?,8 WHrrFIER L. REv. 935 (1987) (reviewing the second half of Yeazell's
history under a much less ambitious thesis); see also Newberg, Book Review, TRiAL, May 1988, at
97-98. Unlike Yeazell's expansive reading, the total English experience could also be read narrowly
as allowing mandatory class actions absent consent in situations analogous to those covered by
Rules 23.1, 23.2, 23(b)(1), and 23(b)(2), but not in situations analogous to those covered by Rule
23(b)(3). Thus, Yeazell may be accused of doing what he claims Coke did-reinterpreting history
to fit his thesis.
For a thesis even more expansive than Yeazell's, see Simon, Visions of Practice and Legal
Thought, 36 STAN. L. REv. 469, 487 (1984) (arguing that the purpose of class litigation is to mobilize the class: "[A] community of interest is something to be created in the course of representation,
rather than a premise of representation").
118. E.g., S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 220.
119. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
120. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982).

1988]

BOOK REVIEW

1115

embodied in Rule 23, as adopted in 1966. Such an assertion might be
very plausible in the year 2138. Nevertheless, the creativity of this assertion depends upon tapping into underground value flows that few
people would recognize immediately on the legal surface of the 1960s. 121
But suppose there is a connection between Burke's parliamentary
theory of interests and class litigation representation. If Burke's theory
of legislative representation was never fully accepted, even in Parliament, why does it follow that the theory should be accepted by the
courts as a universal principle appropriate for judicial function? Further, if Burke borrowed his political theory from the then-existing legal
concept of "virtual" representation by trustees, then should not the
lease-back of Burke's theory to the courts be similarly limited? That is,
the nineteenth century context of "virtual representation" limited the
concept to cases in which the substantive relationship of the trustee to
the class dictated that representation of others without consent was an
absolute necessity. Yet Yeazell goes on to characterize the modern English experience subsequent to 1850 as curtailing the class action, rather
than as merely failing to allow it to grow any further. 22 Yeazell, therefore, subtly assumes that Americans are better off with modern expanded class actions than the English are without them. 23
A number of conceptual analogies are much closer to the concept of
class representation than the concept of political representation. To analyze these other concepts, however, is less exciting and more tedious.
For example, the evolution of the law governing guardians of minors
and incompetents, trustees, corporations, association and union officers,
and bankruptcy representatives seems more directly on point. Simi121. On the other hand, the two concurrent events can be made to fit Yeazell's thesis. Baker
v.Carr,a bilateral plaintiff-defendant class action, is a grand example of the Court's recognition of
a pure "interest" based, judicial class action without consent-a request for judicial relief to order
the legislature to change its representation from a Burkean version of interest to a utilitarian one.
Thus, in the 1960s, just as in the 1830s, the judiciary moves toward a Burkean view of representation of interest without actual consent, while simultaneously it orders the legislature to implement
a view of representation based on individual consent. As Yeazell The Fourth might say in the year
2138: "1 have a far less certain sense for the significance of recent events than for those deeper in a
past." S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 239.
122. Yeazell speculates that Equity's embarrassment from Bleakhouse stunted the growth of
the modern class action in England. Since Yeazell is the first to pose a theory of political representation about class actions, one begins to wonder instead whether the stunted growth was influenced by Equity's subconscious reaction to other political theories, such as the class theories of
Karl Marx. But that is for another book.
123. For example, one would not assume that whereas England substantially has abandoned
the right of trial by jury, American retention of jury trial is a superior policy choice. Yeazell's book
and theses, however, may provide historical and jurisprudential support for "reforming the English
system to provide for private consumer class actions along with contingent fees and punitive damages." England Braces for Jolt in Court Awards-Legal Reform May Lift Ante in Liability Cases,
Wall St. J., June 6, 1988 at 7, col. 2.
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larly, the substantive law of agency in its contract, tort, and community
property forms provides a more direct analogy than the concept of political representation. True, Yeazell in his last chapter does engage in
highly perceptive, free-form jurisprudentializing about the nature of
representation and refers to most of the substantive law concepts about
representation."' He makes no attempt, however, to anchor these substantive concepts with cites to their actual legal origins in history. Instead, Yeazel leaves these substantive concepts about representation
hanging in midair, like Mohammed's coffin, 12 5 while he analogizes the
concept of group representation to nineteenth century political debates
in Parliament. 2 '
Apart from substantive law analogies to the concept of representation, Yeazell also bypasses the legal history of the quintessential representative, the attorney. A long evolution from Greek, Roman, and
German tribal law gives rise to the concepts of representation implicit
in the English barrister and solicitor.12 7 These origins, along with the
common-law prohibitions against solicitation, maintenance, and barratry would seem to have just as much, if not more, to do with a concept
of one person representing another in a class action as the concept of
parliamentary representation. Given the contemporary reality that the
class lawyers are the true economic class representatives, an inquiry
into the lawyers and the financing in Yeazell's historical group litigations might offer some valuable insights and theses about the true social
context.'
124. S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 280-88. By being the first to pose a political theory, Yeazell
has stolen the playing field. Perhaps other political scientists will now find theories different from
Yeazell's to explain the modern class action. See, e.g., supra note 122 and infra note 136.
125. I. Evans, BREWER'S DiCTIONARY OF PHRASE AND FABLE 746 (rev. ed. 1981) (citing Butler,
Hudibras III, ii, at 602). I am indebted to my colleagues, William Bridge and Thomas Mayo, for
this reference.
126. If, as Yeazell develops it, representation without consent is at base a political principle,
then the court must resolve all the policy questions relating to regulation of politics. See, e.g.,
Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. Rav. 1183 (1982); Zacharias, Standing of Public Interest Litigating Groups to Sue on Behalf of Their Members, 39 U. Prrr. L. REV. 453 (1978).
Yeazell analogizes political representation to obtaining votes and class representation to obtaining
financing; in the end, both reduce to the same thing- money. S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 262.
127. Chroust, The Legal Profession in Ancient Athens, 29 NOTRE DAME LAW. 339 (1954);
Chroust, The Legal Profession in Ancient Imperial Rome, 30 NOTRE DAME LAW. 521 (1955);
Chroust, The Legal Profession During the Middle Ages: The Emergence of the English Lawyer
Prior to 1400 (pts. 1 & 2), 31 NOTRE DAME LAW. 537 (1956).
128. See Coffee, Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer on Reform, 62 IND. L.J. 625
(1987); Coffee, The Regulation of EntrepreneurialLitigation:Balancing Fairnessand Efficiency
in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHL L. REv. 877 (1987); see also Garth, Nagel & Plager, The
Institution of the Private Attorney General: Perspectives From An Empirical Study of Class
Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 353 (1988); Kane, Of Carrotsand Sticks: Evaluating the Role
of the Class Action Lawyer, 66 TEx. L. Rav. 385 (1987). See generally Symposium, Class Actions
and Private Attorneys-General, 62 IND. L.J. 497 (1987). The difference between the English and
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Yeazell also bases his analysis on the prior, parallel work of Professor Hazard, rethinking the history and nature of indispensable
parties. 1 9 Yeazell thus follows the new wisdom in declaring that prior
attempts to link class representation to substantive rights were
failures. 130 The present conventional wisdom that class actions are a
procedural matter, 1 1 however, does not make true the proposition that
all questions can simply be delegated to the judiciary and that the judiciary should have the power to allow representation of interests without
consent.' Even if Yeazell intends for his normative principle of repreAmerican rules on attorneys fees may be an important factor in the contrast between modem
American and English class actions, but it is not a factor in Yeazell's analysis.
129. S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 210, 216-24, 238-39. Professor Hazard, supra note 100, criticized Justice Story and others for misleading subsequent courts to the conclusion that defining
indispensable parties was a matter of substantive law, and that the courts had no jurisdiction
without them. Hazard's criticisms were important to the 1966 revision of Rule 19. This revision
redefined the issue of indispensable parties as one of discretionary procedure and lent parallel
support to the analogous revision of Rule 23. Similarly, Yeazell follows Hazard's path to criticize
Lord Hardwicke, Justice Story, and later the Federal Rules of 1938 and Professor Moore for attempting to categorize, to limit, and to legitimate class actions in terms of the types of substantive
rights involved and the res judicata impact of the litigation.
130. This wisdom has now become so conventional that it is similar to Americans poking fun
at the English for wearing wigs in the courtroom because wigs are silly. The English rejoinder is
that legal proceedings are silly and that Americans are naive to think otherwise. In somewhat the
same way, Hardwicke, Story, and Moore may not have made the older formulations out of the selfdeception that the substantive concepts really decided anything. Rather, these older authors may
have had the realistic perception that these concepts expressed consequential conclusions, rather
than tests, for expressing the circumstances under which the nature of substantive relationships
among the group, and between it and its adversary, required various forms of class representation.
Some modern commentators believe Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 leaves almost unlimited
discretion in the judiciary to determine whether and how actions will proceed as class actions. E.g.,
Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL
STUD. 47 (1975). If this is so, then what is the source of law that provides this authority? If the
source is procedural, then in light of the discretion in the Rule and its illusory nature, the Rule
contains a vast grant of lawmaking power to the federal judiciary.
131. True, it is probably better to take off the wigs, see supra note 130, and, as the 1966
Rules revision did, to redraft and redefine both indispensable parties and class actions as matters
of procedure rather than substantive law. The easy assumption that Rule 23 and class actions are
solely matters of procedure is now well entrenched. See Kennedy, The Supreme Court Meets the
Bride of Frankenstein:Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts and the State Multistate Class Action, 34
U. KAN. L. Rav. 255 (1985); [hereinafter Kennedy, The Supreme Court Meets the Bride of Frankenstein] Kennedy, Class Actions: The Right to Opt Out, 25 AR L. REv. 3 (1983). Compare Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical
Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. Rav. 909 (1987) [hereinafter Kennedy, Class Actions] (challenging the
now conventional assumption implied in the Federal Rules that procedure rules ought to be transsubstantive) with Berry, Ending Substance's Indenture to Procedure:The Imperative for Comprehensive Reform of the Class Damage Action, 80 COLuh. L. Rav. 299 (1980) (criticizing hostile
rulings under Rule 23(b)(3) as defeating goals of substantive law).
132. However, in seeming contradiction to his own formulation, Yeazell does acknowledge in
various places throughout the book that the judicial recognition of groups and their representatives also involves the judicial articulation, if not invention, of group substantive rights and duties
involved. E.g., S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 1, 83, 130-37, 259.
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sentational authority to rest upon a shared power to be exercised by the
judiciary and the legislature, the essential dilemma remains of choosing
criteria to decide whether private judicial representation will or will not
13 3
require consent.
From this perspective, the problem with Yeazell's formulation of
"representation of interest without consent" as a justification for the
evolution of medieval group litigation into modern class action is that
the concept says both too little and too much."" The formulation implies that judicial power to recognize groups and to grant power to represent interests without consent is purely a question of procedure,
which is within the inherent power of the judiciary. 3 5 The assertion
ignores the fact that judicial power in each case also is dependent upon
grants of constitutional, legislative, or common-law authority to recognize the substantive and remedial rights, and the duties of the group
that result from the decision to grant recognition and representation.3 6
133. For example, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1982), deliberately provides an old-fashioned "opt-in" form of group remedy not provided for in 1966 Rule
23(b)(3) or 23(c)(2). See Woods v. New York Life Ins. Co., 686 F.2d 578, 581 (7th Cir. 1982).
However, the important contemporary value of Yeazell's thesis is that it focuses debate on the
criteria for determining whether consent is to be required and the method by which consent will be
authenticated. Yeazell's book seems to align him with the Harvard Law Review Developments
Note advocating that all class actions be made mandatory, see Developments in the Law, supra
note 3, and with the proposals to collapse Rule 23 categories and to make opt-out notice discretionary with the judge, and not a matter of right. Gruenberger, Plans for Class-Action Reform,
Nat'l L.J., July 8, 1985, at 32, 33; see also Kennedy, Federal Class Actions: A Need for Legislative
Reform, 32 Sw. L.J. 1209 (1979); Berry, supra note 131.
134. In the search for a universal principle linking all the past with the present, the concept
of "interests" rises to such a high level of abstraction that it becomes meaningless on the one hand,
or infinitely malleable on the other. See Yeazell's analysis of Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940),
cited in S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 232-37.
135. Cf. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). Thus, large questions of
policy may be hidden by labeling the question "procedural." As an extreme example, one might
view the issue in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), as a mere question of
"procedure" (i.e., was Scott a citizen for diversity purposes?). In many ways, the decision to grant
litigating capacity to a group contains major policy choices analogous to those in Dred Scott. See J.
VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY (1978). Even viewed solely as a matter of procedure, Yeazell's maximum
principle focuses solely on the concept of representation (implicitly covered in Rule 23(a)(3) and
(4)) and implies that the additional concepts addressed in the Rule are historically and functionally superfluous.
136. One of Yeazell's main themes throughout the book is the valid point that recognition of
representation of group interest is dependent upon social context. Nevertheless, modern conventional wisdom requires him to reject any prior attempts to link group representation to substantive
law. But if social context is not reflected in substantive law, how else does it enter the judge's
decision? Yeazell thus leaves half of his own equation out of his formula. The result is, as Yeazell
himself speculates, that the concept of judicial power to grant representation of interests without
consent frightens even those who apparently support such a concept, because it appears to place
no limits on its own enabling power. See S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 211-12, 256. The only limit
then would appear to be the judge's vision of social context as advocated by the class attorney. See
infra note 138.
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The heart of Yeazell's thesis is that "the class action justifies action
that legally binds another without his consent by pointing out that his
interest is represented in a situation in which it is inconceivable that he
would not wish his interest to be so pursued. ' 137 The assumptions underlying this rationalization are rather startling. 8s It assumes that the
named plaintiff will always win something of real value for the class. It
ignores the possibility that misguided or faithless plaintiffs will produce
class victories that are illusory, or that the defendant will win or will
transfer the costs of the outcome back to the class."3 9 Most importantly,
however, it questions the capacity of individuals to make intelligent
choices regarding representation, participation, and pursuit of their own
interests. At its core, Yeazell's justification rests upon a judicial paternalism that is paradoxically at odds with individual autonomy and
other democratic values. 40 Contrary to Yeazell's formulation, class actions may find their true justification in a more straightforward theory.
That is, where necessary, the court imposes on the class member a civic
duty to yield individual self-interest to the common good of the
group.

14

'

137. S. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 15 (for full quote, see supra notes 12 & 14). One wonders
how Gary Gilmore would view Yeazell's principle. Gilmore, under a death sentence, opposed with
cool, rational outrage attempts by the ACLU and the NAACP to save him from execution. R.
CovER, 0. Fiss & J. RESNICK, PROCEDURE 437-45 (temp. ed. 1988).
138. Yeazell's assumptions and rationalization apply to the named party representative.
When these assumptions and rationalization are extrapolated to the class attorney, they are
equally startling. For if, as is often the case, the named party is a nominal formality with no real
control over the class attorney, then under Yeazell's formulations, the private class attorney, by
virtue of a lawyer's license, is empowered to represent abstract social interests. See Yeazell, Whose
Interest Is It, Anyway?, Nat'l L.J., May 30, 1988, at 13 (using theory to justify the federal special
prosecutor statute), critized in Letter by C. Selinger, Nat'l L.J., July 18, 1988, at 12.
139. See Justice Jackson's justification for notice in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950), that the beneficiaries have an interest in not having frivolous
claims made on their behalf and in not having those costs imposed on them. Note also the theory
of the dissenters in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 100 (1972), that the cost of victory for the
plaintiffs will be transferred by the defendant back to a consumer class.
140. See Wood, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction and Class Actions, 62 IND. L.J. 597, 606 n.24
(1987) (referring to sources describing "participatory" and "dignatory" values as they relate to due
process).
141. This justification would be analogous to the justifications for union representation by
majority rule, see Finkin, The Limits of Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining,64 MINN. L. REV.
183 (1980); and to justifications for making decisions by complex rules governing majority classes
of creditors in bankruptcy proceedings. See Coffee, Rethinking the Class Action, supra note 128,
at 656-57. Thus, the essential challenge is not to rationalize a fictional constructive consent, as
Yeazell poses, but rather to define the circumstances justifying the power of the judge, the representative, and the lawyer to override the contrary individual choices of individuals and their own
lawyers. See Kennedy, Class Actions, supra note 131, at 79-82; Kennedy, The Supreme Court
Meets the Bride of Frankenstein,supra note 131, at 305-08 & 308 n.237.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
X.

[Vol. 41:1089

CONCLUSION

Many scholars have dug into history in search of the true meaning
of group litigation. Of all the discoveries, Yeazell's are the most creative
and significant. His sophisticated reconstructions of medieval, seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth century group proceedings will enlighten anyone who might think that the many apparent novelties' in
contemporary class actions are anything new under the Anglo sun.3
His recreations show that the judiciary, from the beginning of English
legal history, has taken the power to do substantive justice when the
rights of groups are concerned. In the final analysis, Yeazell's unearthing of medieval group litigation and his rediscovery of Calvert's theory
of class interest representation are major new finds in the search for the
missing links in the evolution of modern American class actions.

142. See, e.g., Marcus, Apocalypse Now? (Book Review), 85 MICH. L. REV. 1267 (1987) (reviewing P. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS Toxic DISASTERS IN THE COURTS (1986)); see
also Stille, A Sense of Dharma, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 29, 1988 at 1, col. 1 (reporting on Indian court
grant of $270 million interim class relief on behalf of Bhopal, India victims against Union Carbide
Co. and the English-derived, Indian Code provision stating that "[n]othing in this code shall be
deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the court to make such orders as may be
necessary for the ends of justice," id. at 43, col. 2).
143. For example, Yeazell's book presents much new specific historical data on class actions
for damages, defendant class actions, and the inherent power of the court to engage in managerial,
mediative, and structural decrees to bring about community dispute resolution. Yeazell's reports of
medieval group litigations as "the law and custom of the realm," see supra note 36, and on behalf
of "the poor," see supra note 2, provide the most startling direct analogies to contemporary class
actions on behalf of welfare recipients, and most recently, "the homeless."

